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This policy note examines the child labor prevention model em-
ployed in Samut Sakhon, Thailand, which aims to prevent migrant 
children from entering the worst forms of child labor in the seafood 
processing industry. The model consists of transitional educa-
tion and corporate social responsibility (CSR). The analysis ex-
amines the context of child labor and explores the challenges and 
opportunities to make anti-child labor efforts more effective.
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Perspectives on Child Labor
Child labor is recognized as a global problem, but 
remains difficult to define. Global policy statements, such as 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child [UNCRC], 1989) and the 
International Labor Organization Convention No. 182 (1999), 
offer broad guidance on child labor, but leave regulation and 
enforcement to individual countries. Migrant child labor in 
Thailand illustrates these difficulties.
In highly developed countries where child labor has es-
sentially been abolished, the term child labor carries a negative 
connotation and is often equated with the most exploitative 
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situations (such as human trafficking and commercial sexual 
exploitation). Its troubling nature can quickly induce an all-
or-nothing rhetoric among child rights advocates, who believe 
that all forms of child labor should be eliminated and who tend 
to employ reactionary strategies, such as boycotting products 
produced by child labor, to achieve their ends.
This rigid vision of child labor is far from the realities ex-
perienced in different societies where the concept of childhood 
is locally and culturally constructed (Myers, 2001). History 
shows that child labor has had a fluid definition that adapts 
to societal changes. For example, the abolition of child labor 
in many Western societies came about after industrialization; 
before then, many child workers did hazardous work in facto-
ries, fields, and mines (Jansson, 2012). Nowadays, it is not un-
common to find older children in poor, working-class families 
in the United States helping to supplement family income by 
working part-time outside of school. Similarly, in Thailand it 
is certainly still culturally accepted for children to help family 
businesses with small chores, such as exchanging money in a 
convenience store. These less intense forms of work are distin-
guished as "light work"—work that is permissible for children 
of minimum working age under specific circumstances that are 
not harmful to the child's health and safety, and that is deemed 
potentially beneficial to the child's development (International 
Labor Organization [ILO], 1973; White, 1996). However, this 
term may not translate between countries: in Thailand, there 
is no distinction between "child labor" and "light work"; chil-
dren doing permissible work are just categorized as "non-child 
labor."
Hence, cultural specificities should be considered when 
conceptualizing child labor, to prevent overly simplistic re-
actions or initiatives. At the same time, scholars caution that 
cultural relativism cannot be used as a valid argument when 
the "labor" fundamentally violates basic human rights, as in 
human trafficking and sexually exploitative situations (Ballet, 
Bhukuth, & Radja, n.d.). Cultural differences do not invalidate 
the need for an international standard on child labor, but they 
must be taken into account when considering how child labor 
is experienced differently across societies (Myers, 2001).
Given the contentious nature of the subject, there is a 
growing recognition that it is not necessary to eliminate all 
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forms of child labor, but certainly the worst forms of child labor 
that are the most detrimental to children's rights and develop-
ment (Edmonds, 2007). This pragmatic view acknowledges 
the reality of child labor and takes into account the complex-
ity behind decision making in a child's family as to financial 
and household needs. Children may enter work intermittently 
when adult income in the household falls and the household 
becomes insecure as more resources are allocated to childrear-
ing; this is especially true for high-fertility households (Dessy, 
2000; Emerson & Knabb, 2006). Others voluntarily enter paid 
work, because they see domestic work as less useful and less 
productive (White, 1996). Households have to determine how 
a child's time is allocated when that time carries an economic 
value (Dessy, 2000). This suggests that if a family's financial 
need is not carefully weighed, simply removing the child from 
work might result in poor families suffering financially, at 
least in the short term (Anker, 2000; Bissell, 2001, 2005).
Hazardous Child Labor and the Worst Forms of Child Labor
According to the ILO Convention No. 182 (ILO, 1999), 
"hazardous work" is the largest category of the worst forms 
of child labor (ILO, 2013). It is defined as work in dangerous 
or unhealthy conditions that could result in a child's death, 
injury, or illness (ILO, 2013). Other worst forms of child labor 
are defined as all forms of slavery (such as trafficking and debt 
bondage), prostitution and pornography-related activities, 
and illicit activities (such as drug trafficking) (ILO, 1999). The 
Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labor allows ratify-
ing countries to define what the "worst forms" are based on 
the work activities (Edmonds, 2009). Additionally, the widely 
adopted United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) (1989) addresses hazardous child labor in Articles 32 
and 34, but does not specify what hazardous work entails; this 
leaves room for interpretation by individual countries.
The inconsistency and uncertainty in the definition of child 
labor can lead to difficulties in making policy and designing 
effective anti-child labor practices. While the worst forms of 
child labor can be easily defined, child work and hazardous 
work depend on more subjective perceptions. Scholars suggest 
using separate estimates to differentiate the various forms 
and level of severity of child labor, such as number of work 
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hours, job characteristics, and working conditions (Anker, 
2000; Edmonds, 2009). Greater specificity in the definition also 
helps take into account work in the domestic realm, which at 
a high intensity can be detrimental to a child's development 
but is often neglected in the mainstream child labor debate, 
which generally focuses only on a child's economic activities 
(Edmonds, 2009).
On a macro level, child labor contributes to generational 
poverty because the human capital is not being developed 
in the area of education: children are at work, not in school 
(Anker, 2000). In general, scholars support education as a 
long-term strategy to combat child labor, yet making educa-
tion compulsory so as to replace work completely could have 
worse consequences for the child and family (Anker, 2000; 
Basu, 1998; Dessy, 2000; Emerson & Knabb, 2006). Hence, 
along with mandating education, scholars suggest implement-
ing alternative anti-child labor programs and strategies to spe-
cifically address poor children's—and their families'—finan-
cial needs and also issues concerning educational quality, such 
as information and awareness campaigns, flexible schooling, 
conditional cash transfers, educational scholarships, improv-
ing the adult labor market, and proper implementation and 
enforcement of laws (Anker, 2000; Basu, 1998; Edmonds, 2007; 
Soares, Ribas, & Osorio, 2010; Yap, Sedlacek, & Orazem, 2001).
Other issues are the unequal returns of education for the 
children, due to varied quality of education across regions and 
social groups; varied access to information about the economy; 
and access to different labor markets (Emerson & Knabb, 
2006). When social mobility is completely restricted, especially 
in an environment where child labor is a generational phe-
nomenon, the child could be trapped in child labor and low 
socioeconomic status (Emerson & Knabb, 2006). Hence, educa-
tion alone might not have the intended positive consequences 
if strategies to increase the degree of opportunity (e.g., increas-
ing quality of education and better access to higher-paying 
jobs) are not simultaneously put in place (Emerson & Knabb, 
2006).
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Child Labor in Thailand
In Thailand, domestic labor shortages for low-skilled jobs 
such as construction and fishery have resulted in a large popu-
lation of migrant workers (between 2 and 4 million persons) 
from neighboring countries (Chantavanich, 2007). The few 
and restrictive legal channels for work migration in Thailand, 
however, result in a large underground labor force. Child labor 
is used in various industries in Thailand, including manufac-
turing, sex work, street begging, fisheries, and construction. 
Child workers can be in short-term or seasonal jobs at border 
areas, or long-term jobs in border provinces and big cities 
(Vungsiriphisal, Auasalung, & Chantavanich, 1997).
In particular, Samut Sakhon province is a major hub for 
low-skilled migrant workers because of its profitable shrimp 
export industry, which averages $2 billion in revenue each 
year and processes 40% of the shrimp produced in Thailand 
(Solidarity Center, 2008). The province has an estimated 
migrant population of 400,000 to 500,000, with at least half 
(between 200,000 and 300,000) being unauthorized (Labor 
Rights Promotion Network Foundation [LRPNF], 2012b). 
More alarmingly, a sizeable subpopulation of the migrants are 
children and youth, who make up about 25% of the migrant 
population (IPEC Project Coordinator, personal communica-
tion, February 22, 2013; LRPNF, 2012b).
Some of these children migrated with their parents and rel-
atives who came to Thailand to seek jobs; some came alone with 
a broker. However, many of the "migrant" children in Samut 
Sakhon were born in Thailand to migrant parents. Although 
born in Thailand, these children are not entitled to Thai na-
tionality and are considered stateless persons (Committee for 
the Protection and Promotion of Child Rights [CPPCR], 2009). 
Migrant children also face long-term problems other than the 
immediate health issues from exposure to harmful work en-
vironments. Many lack proper documentation, which limits 
their access to social services (CPPCR, 2009). Another issue 
is low education attendance, which can be caused by many 
factors, including parental mobility affecting the child's school 
attendance, poverty leading to the need for children to work, 
parent separation, language barrier, and unsupportive parents 
(CPPCR, 2009).
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Description of Samut Sakhon
To understand how different policies and strategies play 
out, it is important to learn how child labor takes place in the 
local context. Samut Sakhon province is one of the biggest 
seafood processing industrial areas in Thailand, with 909 
seafood processing factories, according to the Labor Protection 
and Welfare Office (LRPNF, 2012b). The majority of factories 
are subcontracted, primary-processing sheds (PPs) for the 
larger factories, known as longs. PPs have existed for several 
decades in Samut Sakhon; initially, resident Thai families pro-
cessed raw seafood materials (peeling shrimp and cleaning 
squid) in their own homes. However, as the industry grew 
significantly larger, these longs began processing more raw 
materials and needed to hire extra help, most of whom were 
migrant workers.
Processing jobs at the longs have no fixed time sched-
ules; workers are paid by the number of kilograms of seafood 
(mostly shrimp) they have processed. Due to their tradition-
ally small sizes, many of these PPs are not officially registered 
as businesses with the government. This remains the case for 
some, even when the number of employees reaches between 
50 and over 200, and the nature of the work becomes industrial 
rather than home-based. Being unregistered makes it very dif-
ficult for the government and affiliated larger factories to regu-
late and monitor the production by these PPs, making them a 
prime venue for the use of child labor. Although a portion of the 
PPs have sought to upgrade their status to that of a company, 
most do not see any incentives to register, because they would 
have to pay business fees and meet regulations. Moreover, 
many of these PPs began as small, family-size operations, and 
most do not have the export business knowledge to handle the 
complicated documents and procedures involved in operating 
at that level (TFFA, personal communication, March 22, 2013). 
Thus, sanctions currently in place for using child labor have 
only a marginal effect on PPs, because they are unregistered 
businesses and largely invisible to government regulators.
The head of the Provincial Office of Employment estimat-
ed that the labor demand in the seafood processing industry 
is quite high, perhaps 300,000 workers (Field notes, May 17, 
2013). With this high demand for workers, the PPs often ignore 
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state regulations and hire younger children (LRPNF, 2012a). 
An estimate of 6,000 to 8,000 children under age 15, and about 
20,000 to 30,000 children between 15 and 18 years of age, are 
working in the PPs (LRPNF, 2012a). Quite a few of the children 
between 12 and 14 years of age also claim to be 18 years old or 
older, to meet legal requirements for work registration (Field 
notes, May 17, 2013).
The jobs done by children are mostly contract jobs, with 
pay based on the number of kilograms of shrimp peeled (Field 
notes, May 17, 2013). Most children work alongside family 
members and receive less pay; often their pay is included in 
the payment to the adult family members (ILO, n.d.). Most 
working children are unregistered, which puts them at risk 
for deportation even if their parents are registered workers 
(LRPNF, 2012a).
The work conditions of seafood processing jobs are dan-
gerous and harmful to children. Some children who are not 
in school work night shifts, from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. con-
secutively, with no rest period (ILO, n.d.; LRPNF, 2013). The 
work tasks include peeling shrimp (sometimes with a knife), 
washing fish, cleaning squid, and unloading heavy loads at 
the market, as well as drying, boiling, and peeling the seafood 
(ILO, n.d.). Research shows that children who work peeling 
shrimp and collecting fish are required to work long hours with 
their hands and feet soaking in filthy water (Vungsiriphisal 
et al., 1997). These work tasks constantly expose children to 
dirty water and substances that cause skin disease, respira-
tory infections, and stomach illnesses (Solidarity Center, 2008); 
the PPs also lack standard sanitation facilities, so workers 
are prone to developing and transmitting diseases. Children 
are given work tools (gloves and scissors) that offer minimal 
protection when used consecutively for long hours, and there 
are no special protections for operating machines and equip-
ment in the plants (ILO, n.d.). Injuries and sickness are poorly 
managed, with store-bought drugs only, as many do not have 
public health insurance (Solidarity Center, 2008). Given the 
dangerous work and hidden work locations, working chil-
dren are extremely vulnerable to accidents, labor exploitation, 
physical and sexual abuse, and threats (Field notes, May 17, 
2013).
Child Labor in Thailand
Anti-Child Labor Efforts in Samut Sakhon
To address the problem of child labor, with a special focus 
on education, a coalition of government agencies, international 
and local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and busi-
nesses affiliated with international corporate social responsi-
bility organizations was created in Samut Sakhon. The lead 
coordinating organization was the Labor Rights Promotion 
Network Foundation (LRPNF), a local human rights NGO 
involved in promoting migrant rights and combating human 
trafficking. The coalition has been involved in documenting 
the use of child labor in the province, mitigating its use, and 
promoting education for migrant children.
The coalition sought to identify and remedy gaps in formal 
education of Burmese migrant children and youth. Many 
Burmese children worked and also attended informal schools 
that provided limited education and no transcript of atten-
dance and graduation. Changes in Thai law allowing migrant 
children to attend Thai schools seemingly bolstered efforts re-
garding education. LRPNF reached out to Thai public schools 
to set up a partnership to implement transitional education 
centers or learning centers within schools, so that migrant chil-
dren could enter the official educational system once they were 
proficient in the Thai language. The goal was to help migrant 
children integrate into mainstream Thai society and access 
better career opportunities, as opposed to low-paying seafood 
processing jobs, by helping them achieve formal education. 
Despite enrolling several hundred Burmese migrant children 
and youth in local schools, the LRPNF estimates that only 10% 
of the target population is presently enrolled in school (Field 
notes, May 17, 2013).
Challenges
Corruption and ambivalence in the governmental sector 
challenge efforts to address child labor. Laws and policies 
are in place, but implementation and enforcement are poor 
because businesses bribe government inspectors to avoid fines 
or punishments for using child labor. Government officials are 
seemingly indifferent to corrupt practices, which results in na-
tional policies essentially having no effect at the operational 
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level. The current national efforts on child labor prevention 
and implementation of laws are weak, largely due to the gov-
ernment being ignorant of the problem at hand or unengaged 
in problem solving. 
Another major challenge is negative public attitudes 
toward migrants. Many local schools and Thai parents are still 
against enrolling migrant children, perceiving that migrant 
children compete with Thai students for educational resources 
(Field notes, May 17, 2013). Thai teachers were found to be 
more sympathetic toward migrant children, but they are by 
no means advocates; they help to maintain the status quo and 
often give preferential treatment to Thai students (Field notes, 
May 17, 2013). Observations of public life in Samut Sakhon re-
vealed a highly segregated social space, which creates great 
challenges for increasing social integration and better under-
standing between the Thai and Burmese communities.
Other challenges arise in implementing educational policy. 
Only a handful of schools are willing to accept migrant chil-
dren, and those schools are then overwhelmed because 
demand for seats greatly exceeds supply. Schools also fre-
quently face internal personnel issues, lack of Burmese and 
Burmese-speaking teachers, frequent relocation of children, 
and lack of field staff collaboration partners who can work 
with migrants (Field notes, May 17, 2013).
The challenges are compounded by the many obstacles to 
retaining children in school. Many migrant families still do not 
see the value of education, because adult family members have 
low educational attainment and expect children to work to 
support the family (IPEC Project Coordinator, personal com-
munication, February 22, 2013). Once enrolled, children are at 
high risk of dropping out: risk factors include frequent mobil-
ity, possible return to the home country, fear of arrest because 
of unauthorized status, and the need to do at least intermittent 
work to help support the family (Field notes, May 17, 2013; 
IPEC Project Coordinator, personal communication, February 
22, 2013).
Last, weak policy implementation at the provincial level 
often leads children to enter the labor force. For example, 15- to 
17-year-old children are legally permitted to work if they regis-
ter with the Provincial Employment Office—but employment 
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office staff tend to avoid helping them, as they know that many 
forge documentation to pass as older (Office of Employment, 
personal communication, June 29, 2013). However, these em-
ployment office practices push even work-eligible children into 
underground jobs that expose them to abuses. Also, some local 
officials do not follow the national policy of allowing migrant 
children to attend Thai schools, and face no liability because 
the provincial educational office is not involved in overseeing 
policy implementation (Field notes, May 17, 2013).
Local experts on the education of migrant children stated 
that the transitional education model is promising and could 
be replicated to assist other schools and educators in Thailand 
in working with migrant children. Currently, improvement 
and expansion of the transitional education model are restrict-
ed, as the burden falls entirely on NGOs. Also, because the 
provincial education office is not involved, the national policy 
has no practical effect: the decision to accept migrant children 
is made by individual schools. This complicates the NGOs' 
and practitioners' tasks on the operational level. A state agency 
should take on more responsibility for implementing the edu-
cational provision regarding migrant children, by centralizing 
the model and thus expanding the capacity of many schools. 
Also, there are longer-term strategies: With greater business 
funding, the collaboration aims to increase the capacity of 
schools to accept migrant students by increasing the number 
of partner schools and staffing them with teachers experienced 
in the transitional education model (Field notes, May 17, 2013).
Because of the physical and psychological harms associ-
ated with shrimp/seafood processing, the schools participat-
ing in the model do not merely provide education; they are 
also safe spaces protecting migrant children from dangerous 
work environments. For example, they can serve as childcare 
centers, so that children of working parents are not left idle 
or unsupervised at home, and thus prone to joining in illicit 
activities. The schools are also major social bridges between 
migrants and local Thais (P. Nuntase, personal communica-
tion, July 9, 2013).
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Conclusions 
The dynamics of child labor in Samut Sakhon are those 
raised in the literature. Schearf notes that among migrant 
children, irregular school attendance or dropping out com-
pletely is common, as children choose work to help their 
families financially (Schearf, 2012). This echoes the concerns 
of other scholars that educational provision does not necessar-
ily exclude the need to work, when poverty is still a continu-
ous struggle for families (Bissell, 2005; Okyere, 2013). Further, 
scholars suggest that enforcing mandatory education without 
considering the families' financial struggles may only push 
children in poor families further into informal and unprotect-
ed work areas, as they seek work out of necessity (Basu, 1998; 
Dessy, 2000; Emerson & Knabb, 2006). Therefore, the Thai 
government should proceed with caution and assess the social 
environment properly before enforcing compulsory education 
for migrant children. Instead, it should focus on increasing 
migrant children's access to education—overcoming obstacles 
to enrollment and retention—and the quality of education in 
the first place.
Currently, in the Samut Sakhon model, the larger seafood 
export businesses supporting the educational collaborative 
only offer one-time financial help (such as scholarships and 
building schools), mainly to improve their company image 
and public relations with international buyers (Field notes, 
May 17, 2013). However, their participation is inconsistent 
and does not offer long-term incentives for migrant parents to 
enroll their children in school.
If implemented correctly and with appropriate long-term 
planning, corporate social responsibility initiatives can dras-
tically reduce the child labor rate. For example, in the 1990s, 
for the first time an entire business industry (in this case, the 
Bangladeshi garment industry) signed an agreement with the 
international governmental organizations ILO and UNICEF 
(Neilsen, 2005) to address child labor use. The ILO became 
the external monitor of the industry's performance under that 
agreement. Subsequently, child labor use went from 42.8% to 
4.5% in inspected garment factories and from 3.6% to 0.26% 
in the total Bangladeshi labor force (Neilsen, 2005). Another 
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Bangladeshi knitwear export association entered into a similar 
agreement and five-year program (2006-2011) with the ILO 
and a local NGO to develop and improve mid-level gover-
nance to target the lower supplier chain where child labor 
mostly occurs (Wise & Ali, 2008). To achieve real results, the 
Samut Sakhon model will have to demand stronger commit-
ment from the seafood business associations, as well as mid-
level management in the PPs, to develop and enforce similar 
long-term mandates on abandoning child labor use and pro-
viding more consistent financial assistance for education.
Child labor occurs in settings that are difficult to access 
and even find out about, which makes dependable estimates 
difficult to construct. Certainly the seafood processing indus-
try illustrates this point. The international media has played 
a role in keeping child labor in the shadows by the enormous 
attention it gives to human trafficking at the expense of ignor-
ing the more pervasive problem of child labor. Further inves-
tigation is warranted to achieve a better and separate under-
standing of child labor and human trafficking in the fishing 
and seafood processing industries, and may result in more bal-
anced reporting.
The child labor prevention model that has been imple-
mented in Samut Sakhon since 2004 targets migrant children 
who are at risk of entering exploitative labor in the seafood 
processing plants. The model provides those children with 
transitional education that leads to Thai formal education, 
through which they will have a better chance of integrating 
socially into the local area and obtaining improved career op-
portunities. Experts generally view the effect of these efforts 
on the child labor situation in Samut Sakhon as positive. 
Nonetheless, the experts identified common challenges, such 
as corruption, negative local attitude toward migrants, and 
lax policy implementation, that hinder program effectiveness 
on the operational level. Further, the study cautions against 
hasty enforcement of compulsory education. Rather, as shown 
in several other countries and industries, efforts aimed at al-
leviating poverty among migrant families and ensuring acces-
sibility and quality of education would be most effective, so 
that the migrant children's need to work in the first place can 
essentially be eliminated and school enrollment and retention 
enhanced.
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